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F. Hodge O'Nealt
Before World War II, the same rules were applied with few exceptions
to public-issue corporations and to close corporations. Legislatures and
courts seldom recognized the differences in the nature and needs of the
two types of corporations; even less did they attempt to formulate rules
and concepts to meet the special problems of close corporations.
Similarly, treatises and other books generally did not differentiate in
their analyses of legal problems between the corporate giants and close
corporations. Even books of corporation forms did not distinguish between
specimen provisions suitable for use in charters, by-laws, and other docu-
ments of public-issue corporations and those appropriate for use in docu-
ments for close corporations. The editor or law teacher putting together
a form book, usually having had little or no experience himself in actual
corporate practice, went to the corporate giants with their high-priced
legal talent, supposedly the best, for specimen documents to include in
the book. Apparently the thought did not occur to anyone-or if it did
he quickly suppressed it-that however splendidly these documents served
the purposes for which they were drafted they might not be adapted to
the needs of a closely-held enterprise.
It is not surprising that under these conditions most lawyers turned out
close corporations that were small replicas of public-issue corporations.
Seldom was an effort made to eliminate from the corporate form any of
the traditional corporate attributes, no matter how disadvantageous and
undesirable those attributes might be in a small, closely-held business.
Still less frequently did a lawyer recognize that the uniqueness of each
business enterprise might call for really individualized tailoring of the
corporate form to the needs of the particular enterprise.
Even before World War II, however, a few voices "cried out," advoca-
ting statutory and judicial recognition of the special needs and problems
of one-man companies, family corporations, and incorporated partner-
ships.1 For instance, Joseph L. Weiner, a New York practitioner, after
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1 Fuller, "The Incorporate Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company," 51 Harv. L.
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discussing at length the distinctive characteristics and needs of the close
corporation and the inappropriateness of applying many provisions of the
corporation statutes to close corporations, concluded:
If we are to avoid burdening -the private company with regulations neces-
sary only for the large, we must sever the small and the large. Equally so
if we are to regulate the large with a proper consideration of the interests
involved.2
And Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., then Dean of the College of Law of the Uni-
versity of Iowa, later Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, after examining trends in what were then the most recently enacted
corporation statutes, and finding many of the provisions unsuited for
one-man companies and close corporations, stated:
It would seem that an intelligent approach to the general problem of in-
corporation would require at least three types of general incorporation laws
in each state: One for the single incorporator, another for the small con-
cern, and a third for the extensive business setup ....
Since World War II, extensive developments have occurred in close
corporation law and practice. This article discusses those developments,
pointing out the respective roles therein of lawyers, legal writers, legisla-
tures, and courts.
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND WRITERS
It is a tribute to the resourcefulness and persistence of some members
of the corporate bar and of a handful of law teachers and writers that
the close corporation has evolved into a virtually new type of business
organization, much better suited than the older corporate form to family
and other closely-held enterprises. Despite the clumsy legal rules, some
skilled and conscientious lawyers organizing closely-held enterprises
struggled to set up business structures suited to the enterprises and cal-
culated to gratify the legitimate desires of their clients. For instance,
they tried-and with considerable success-in some of the corporations
they organized to eliminate majority rule and free transferability of
shares.
Existing incorporation statutes assume that this type of company [the one-man company]
shall be operated and governed in the same manner and subject to the same limitations
and restrictions as apply to the company with a thousand shareholders, despite the
existence of numerous and important dissimilarities between the two types of enter-
prises. ... [I]t would seem highly desirable that the movement for the modernization
of incorporation statutes should take cognizance of its [the one-man company's] peculiar
problems and needs through the inclusion in new legislation of provisions appropriate
to the management and control of this type of enterprise.
2 Weiner, "Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation," 27 Mich. L. Rev. 273, 284
(1929).
3 Rutledge, "Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes," 22 Wash. U.L.Q. 305.
339 (1937).
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To by-pass the rules which legislatures and courts had evolved for
public-issue corporations, but which were restrictive and inappropriate
as applied to close corporations, the lawyers had to plan and draft with
great imagination and ingenuity. In providing serviceable frameworks for
the businesses they organized, they resorted (and continue to resort) to an
interesting array of legal devices-pre-incorporation agreements, special
charter and by-law clauses, share transfer restrictions, shareholders'
agreements of various sorts, voting trusts, irrevocable proxies, and long-
term employment contracts.
Legal writers also, soon after World War II, began to concentrate on
the problems of close corporations and to turn out vast amounts of
literature, much of it devoted to planning and drafting techniques service-
able in tailoring the corporate form to closely-held businesses. This writing
reached full tide in the 1950's,4 but the flow of writing is continuing un-
abated, many of the articles written in the 1960's focusing on the law of
a particular state.5
The effect of this growing body of literature has been to refine close
corporation planning and drafting techniques and to bring those tech-
niques to the attention of an ever-expanding body of practicing lawyers.
Furthermore, the constant harping on the special needs and problems of
close corporations undoubtedly has served to educate legislators and
judges and to create a favorable climate for a more satisfactory legisla-
tive and judicial treatment of close corporations.
Tm ROLE OF LEGISLAT1RES
In Great Britain, special statutory provisions govern the "private com-
pany," the English equivalent of the American close corporation; 6 but
4 See, e.g., O'Neal, Close Corporations: Law and Practice (1958) (2 vols); Hornstein,
"Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 435 (1953);
O'Neal, "Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter
Clauses," 10 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1956) ; Powers, "Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms
Versus Needs," 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1958); Scott, "The Close Corporation in Con-
temporary Business," 13 Bus. Law. 741 (1958); "Symposium-Close Corporations," 52 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 345 (1957).
5 See, e.g., Cross, "The Close Corporation in Connecticut," 35 Conn. BJ. 432 (1961); Ham,
"The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law," 50 Ky. L.J. 125 (1961); Kessler, "Certificate
of Incorporation for a New York Close Corporation: A Form," 33 Fordham L. Rev. 541
(1965); Neef & Sullivan, "The Close Corporation in Michigan," 39 Mich. S.B.J., July 1960,
p. 8; Oppenheim, "The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treatment,"
12 Hastings L.J. 227 (1961); Stevens, "Close Corporations and the New York Business Cor-
poration Law of 1961," 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 481 (1962).
6 For a discussion of the British private companies, see McFadyean, "The American Close
Corporation and Its British Equivalent," 14 Bus. Law. 215 (1958). The "private company"
is defined as a company "which (a) limited the membership to fifty, (b) restricted the right
to transfer shares, and (c) prohibited any invitation to the public." Gower, The Principles
of Modern Company Law 13 (1954). The Jenkins Committee on Company Law Reform,
however, has recommended that the distinction between public and private companies be
abolished. Company Law Reform Committee, Cmnd. No. 1749, 111 31, 63, 67 (1962). For
discussions of the Committee Report, see Pennington, Company Law Reform (pts. 1 and 2),
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in this country, with one exception to be noted later, the states have not
enacted separate statutes for the close corporation. One reason for the
legislative failure to provide separate rules for the close corporation has
been the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition of the close corpo-
ration. 7 This difficulty is illustrated by the experience of the New York
Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of the Corporation Laws,
the committee that drafted the new New York Business Corporation
Law. At the very inception of the revision study, the committee explored
the desirability of a separate "Close Business Corporation Law," but
after investigation it concluded that the close corporation could not be
defined with sufficient precision to delineate clearly between close corpo-
rations and public-issue corporations.' A second reason for the failure of
legislatures to enact separate close corporation statutes might be a fear
that separate legislation would impede the growth of close corporations
and hinder the gradual evolution of the more successful of the closely-held
enterprises into public-issue corporations. Thirdly, some lawyers serving
giant corporations have fought separate treatment of small incorporated
enterprises, perhaps because separation would tend to isolate the giant
companies politically (depriving them of their identification with politi-
cally potent small business) and perhaps lead to separate and more severe
regulation and taxation for the giant corporations.
Even though the state legislatures-with the one exception to be noted
later-have not seen fit to enact separate statutes for close corporations,
the labors of the pioneer writers who pleaded so eloquently for legislative
recognition of the close corporations have not been entirely in vain. Most
corporation statutes enacted since World War II contain a number of
provisions which alleviate problems of the close corporation. Some of
these statutory provisions, although they apply to both public-issue and
close corporations, give an increased flexibility to the corporate form and
thus permit a tailoring of the corporate device to the needs of closely
107 Sol. J. 163, 184 (1963); Note, 25 Modem L. Rev. 703 (1962). For a discussion of busi-
ness units on the European continent similar to the American close corporation, see Treillard,
"The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 546
(1953). For an explanation of special German statutes, see Schneider, "The American Close
Corporation and Its German Equivalent," 14 Bus. Law. 228 (1958).
7 As early as 1948, the New York Law Revision Commission struggled unsuccessfully with
the definitional problem. See 1948 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 381-427 (1948). In the same
year, Israels commented "that no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation
appears ever to have been worked out . . . ." Israels, "The Close Corporation and the Law,"
33 Cornell L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
8 See Joint Legislative Comm. To Study Revision of Corporation Laws, (First) Interim
Report to 1957 Session of N.Y. State Legislature, 1957 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17, at 115, as
discussed in Hoffman, "New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York Under Its
New Business Corporation Law," 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1-2 (1961).
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held enterprises. Other provisions were drafted primarily to meet the
needs of close corporations, and in practical operation apply largely, if
not exclusively, to such corporations.
Statutory provisions beneficial to the close corporation found in one
or more states include the following:9 (1) statutes giving the corporate
form greater flexibility' by authorizing the use of optional charter
clauses10 and special by-law provisions;11 (2) statutes permitting a
corporation to be formed by a single incorporator; 12 (3) statutes per-
mitting a corporation to have less than the traditional three directors; 3
(4) statutes authorizing high quorum and high vote requirements for
shareholder and director action;14 (5) statutes relaxing the requirements
of formal corporate meetings and permitting directors and shareholders
to act by unanimous written consent; ' 5 (6) statutes expressly authorizing
restrictions on the transfer of stock;'" (7) statutes empowering directors
to fix their own compensation as directors and officers; 17 (8) statutes in
a few states requiring directors to declare dividends in specified circum-
stances; 18 (9) statutes sanctioning shareholder agreements allocating
corporate control and impinging upon powers traditionally within the
province of the board of directors or otherwise departing in important
respects from the traditional pattern of corporate management;'" (10)
statutes permitting special contractual arrangements among the share-
holders providing when and under what circumstances the corporation
will be dissolved or fixing nonstatutory dissolution procedures;20 (11)
statutes authorizing judicial dissolution of a corporation in the event of
deadlock among the shareholders or directors (so-called "dissolution on
deadlock" statutes);21 and (12) statutes authorizing court appointment
9 For a more detailed discussion of many of the statutory sections listed, see O'Neal,
"Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations," 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 341 (1958).
30 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(1) (1953); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b). For
a discussion of various types of statutes authorizing optional charter clauses, see O'Neal, supra
note 4, §§ 3.40.
11 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 601(c) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.15 (Baldwin 1953).
12 E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 450.3 (Supp. 1961); Wis. Stat. § 180.44 (1961).
13 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1964); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.34
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964). These statutes provide that where the corporation has less than
three shareholders, the number of directors may be less than three but not less than the
number of shareholders.
14 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616, 709; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b) (4) (1953); Wis.
Stat. §§ 180.28, .35 (1961).
15 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228 (1953); Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.13 (Supp. 1961).
16 E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 501(g); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.22 (1956).
17 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.60 (Page 1964); Wis. Stat. § 180.31 (1961).
18 E.g., N.. Stat. Ann. § 51-3-16 (1953).
19 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-68 (1960).
20 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(3) (1960); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.31 (1961).
21 E.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 4650-51; Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, §§ 157.86-.91 (Smith-Hurd
1954); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104.
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of a provisional director for a corporation with a board of directors that
is evenly divided on management policies.22
Perhaps brief mention should be made of one piece of legislation in
which Congress singled out the close corporation for special treatment.
Subchapter S,23 which was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the
Technical Amendments Act of 1958,24 permits small business corporations
that meet specified requirements to elect a special tax status in many
respects similar to that of a partnership. 5 Among the requirements for
eligibility to elect this status are that the corporation be a domestic
corporation, that it have only one class of stock, and that it have less
than eleven shareholders. Obviously a public-issue corporation cannot
qualify; many, if not most, close corporations can.
TnE ROLE OF THE PIONEERING STATES
Four states-New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida
-rate special mention as innovators in legislation applicable to close
corporations. One of the earliest and perhaps the most publicized
statute avowedly passed to meet special needs of close corporations was
Section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, enacted in 1948.28
That statute, enacted on the recommendation of the New York Law
Revision Commission, authorized inclusion in the certificate of incorpo-
ration of New York corporations of provisions fixing high quorums and
requiring high votes for shareholder and director action. This legislation,
which permitted organizers of a corporation to give minority share-
holders a power to veto corporate decisions, was hailed at the time of
its passage as the first important legislative recognition of the special
management needs of close corporations.27
22 E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 819; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 315.323 (Supp. 1964).
23 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 1371-77.
24 P.,. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stat. 1650 (1958).
25 The Senate Finance Committee stated that an objective of Subchapter S was to permit
businesses to elect a form of business organization "without the necessity of taking into
account major differences in tax consequences." S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1958). Subchapter S is sometimes inaccurately described as permitting a qualifying corpora-
tion to elect to be taxed as a partnership. The subchapter actually provides, however, for an
entirely new classification-one that differs in important respects from the partnership. Since
important tax differences exist between the tax status of a partnership and the status of a
corporation that elects under Subchapter S, choosing a business form for a closely held
enterprise is now considerably more difficult than it was before the enactment of Subchapter
S because there is now an additional alternative to consider.
26 N.Y. Stock Corporation Law § 9 (1948), N.Y. Sess. Laws, c. 862, § 1, as amended
(1948). This statutory section has now been replaced by the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law.
27 de Capriles & Reichardt, "1947-1948 Survey of New York Law-Corporations," 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 747 (1948). Actually, high quorum and high vote requirements had been
authorized in a number of states at an earlier date. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (b) (4)
(1953), enacted in 1935; Cal. Corp. Code § 816, enacted in 1947.
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The first really extensive and imaginative statutory innovations to
meet close corporation needs occurred, however, in the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act,28 enacted in 1955. The drafting commission
for that act-under the leadership of Dean Elvin R. Latty of the Duke
University School of Law-made a diligent study of the peculiarities of
close corporations, and many sections of the statute were drafted with
the special needs of close corporations in mind.29 Legislators in other
states might well give serious consideration to this imaginative and
carefully drawn legislation.
Perhaps two pioneering sections of the North Carolina statute deserve
special attention. One of these sections"0 contains provisions to the follow-
ing effect: (1) a contract between two or more shareholders to vote their
shares as a unit for the election of directors shall be enforceable between
the parties for as long as ten years, if it is in writing and signed by the
parties; (2) in a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in
the markets a written agreement to which all the shareholders have
assented (whether embodied in the charter or by-laws or in a side
agreement signed by all the parties) which relates to any phase of
the corporation's affairs, shall not be invalidated on the ground that
its effect is to make the parties partners among themselves; and (3) an
agreement among some or all of the shareholders in a corporation, whether
solely among themselves or between one or more of them and a non-
shareholder, is not invalid as between the parties on the ground that it
interferes with the discretion of the board of directors, but by making
such an agreement the shareholders who are parties assume the same
liability as directors for managerial acts.31
The other section"2 authorizes judicial liquidation of a corporation in
an action by a shareholder if the corporation's 'charter or any other
28 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-1 (1960); N.C. Laws, c. 1371 (1955).
29 See Latty, "The -Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation
Act," 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432 (1956); Latty, Powers & Breckinridge, "The Proposed North
Carolina Business Corporation Act," 33 N.C.L. Rev. 26, 45 (1954).
30 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-73 (1960).
31 See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-24(a) (1960): "Subject to the provisions of the charter,
the by-laws or agreements between the shareholders otherwise lawful, the business and affairs
of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors."
32 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a) (1960):
(a) The superior court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business of a cor-
poration in an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(3) All of the present shareholders are parties to, or are transferees or subscribers of
shares with actual notice of a written agreement, whether embodied in the charter or
separate therefrom, entitling the complaining shareholder to liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of some event which has subsequently
occurred ....
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written agreement among all the shareholders entitled the complaining
shareholder to liquidation or dissolution at will or on the occurrence of
events which have subsequently occurred.3 8
The new South Carolina Business Corporation Act,84 passed in 1962,
also focuses on the close corporation. The Reporter of the draft version
of that act, Professor Ernest L. Folk III, stated that one of the principal
guidelines of the draftsmen was the desire to permit shareholders in a
close corporation to act in the corporation's internal affairs almost as
freely as if they were in a partnership. 5 Henry B. Richardson, Chair-
man of the Joint Committee that drafted the act, described the drafts-
men's efforts to prepare an act suitable for the close corporation, com-
menting as follows:
The draft statute gives special attention to the needs of the small, closely
held family enterprise which undoubtedly comprises the majority of all
present South Carolina corporations. New statutes increasingly recognize the
needs of these small corporations which are almost identical with partner-
ships except for their limited liability as to third parties. First of all, many
provisions state a rule of law which is applicable only unless the articles of
incorporation provide otherwise. Thus, there is wide leeway for the business-
man and his lawyer to plan the corporate structure which best suits his
needs. These provisions can readily be identified because they start with
language such as 'Unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide,'
or 'subject .to the articles of incorporation.' Thus, the closely held enterprise
may manage its affairs directly by the shareholders or by a board of directors
no larger than the number of shareholders, e.g., one director when there
is a single shareholder, two directors when there are two shareholders, etc.
In addition, [sections 22-16.15 and 22-16.22] . . . validate agreements
among shareholders with respect to voting and as to the internal manage-
merit of corporate affairs, respectively. Creditor rights, however, remain
wholly unimpaired. Other provisions validate the kind of informal action by
directors and shareholders which is so typical of the smaller enterprise.
Finally, the draft Act facilitates dissolution of the corporation which is
paralyzed by deadlock, but also provides for alternative relief which may
save the enterprise as a going concern. Indeed, the protection of minority
interests and the enforcement of the duties of directors and majority share-
holders is important, not only to secure justice, but also to encourage invest-
ment in local enterprises. For by assuring investors that they will be pro-
tected by the courts, we can give them stronger inducement to place their
funds in local enterprises, thereby promoting the state economy as a whole. 6
83 For a discussion of several other sections of the North Carolina act which are par-
ticularly applicable to close corporations, see Latty, supra note 29.
34 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-11.1 to -31.2 (Supp. 1964); Laws of S.C. (1962 [521 1996).
35 Folk, "The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law," 15 S.C.L. Rev. 275,
281 (1963). Incidentally, draftsmen of future corporation statutes would do well to consult
the comprehensive and clearly written Reporter's Notes to the draft version of the South
Carolina Act.
36 Richardson, Draft Version, South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1962, at ix-x(Judicial Council of S.C. 1961). References to sections of the draft statute have been omitted
from the quotation.
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A provision of the South Carolina Act unique in the United States
is section 12-22.23.17 To be understood that section has to be read to-
gether with section 12-22.15(a),3 which itself is designed to deal with
deadlock and dissension in close corporations.
Section 12-22.15(a) gives the courts power to liquidate a corporation
in an action brought by a shareholder, whenever: (1) the directors are
so divided respecting management that the votes required for action by
the board of directors cannot be obtained and the shareholders are
unable to terminate the division, with the consequence that (a) the
corporation is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury, or (b) the
business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to
the advantage of the shareholders generally; (2) the shareholders are
so divided that they have failed, for a period which includes at least
two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors
whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the qualification
of their successors; (3) the shareholders are so divided respecting
management that (a) the corporation is suffering or will suffer irreparable
injury, or (b) the affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of all the shareholders; (4) the acts of the directors
or those in control of the corporation (a) are illegal, or fraudulent, or
dishonest, or (b) are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial either to the cor-
poration or to any shareholder; (5) corporate assets are being misapplied
or wasted; or (6) the petitioning shareholder has a right under the
articles of incorporation to dissolution of the corporation at will or upon
the occurrence of a specified event or contingency.
Section 12-22.23 gives the courts unusually broad powers as to rem-
edies. It provides that in an action filed by a shareholder to dissolve
the corporation on the grounds enumerated in section 12-22.15, the
court may make such order or grant such relief as it deems appropriate,
including an order (1) cancelling or altering any provision contained
in the articles of incorporation or in the by-laws of the corporation;
(2) cancelling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation; (3) directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or
of shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action;
or (4) providing for the purchase at their fair value of shares of any
shareholder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders. The
section goes on to state that such relief "may be granted as an alternative
to a decree of dissolution, or may be granted whenever the circumstances
of the case are such that relief, but not dissolution, would be appropriate."
37 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1964) was § 12.23 in the draft statute.
38 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-22.15(a) (Supp. 1964), was § 12.15(a) in the draft statute.
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Section 12-22.15 is based in large part upon Model Act, Section 90, s
but the Model Act does not contain anything similar to Section 12-22.23.
The latter section gives a court broad power to adjust its decree to the
particular problem before it, and thus to provide an adequate and lasting
solution. In the absence of statute, courts have not felt that they had
such broad powers.
Section 12-22.23 was taken from Section 210 of the English Com-
panies Act of 1948.40 As the Reporter for the South Carolina Act points
out, section 210 "has not been invoked, in any reported case or known
litigation, with respect to a publicly owned corporation, and indeed it is
appropriate only to the closely held enterprise." '4 1
The new New York Business Corporation, Law,4" enacted in 1961 and
effective in 1963, although geared primarily to public-issue corporations,
has an extensive array of close corporation provisions. Only a few of
these provisions will be discussed in detail here because the statute's
close corporation provisions have been comprehensively discussed else-
where.48
One of the most important provisions of the New York statute is
section 620, which states in part:
(a) An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and
signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any voting
rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they
may agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon
by them.
(b) A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by
law as improperly restrictive of the discretion or powers of the board in its
management of corporate affairs shall nevertheless be valid: 44
(1) If all the incorporators or holders of record of all outstanding shares,
whether or not 'having voting power, have authorized such provision in the
certificate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and
(2) If, subsequent to the adoption of such provision, shares are trans-
ferred or issued only to persons who had knowledge or notice thereof or
consented in writing to such provision.
(c) A provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be valid only so long
as the shares of the corporation are not listed on a national securities ex-
change or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market, by one or more
members of a national or affiliated securities association.45
A provision of the kind authorized by paragraph (b) relieves the direc-
89 The Model Act was prepared by the American Bar Association and its Committee on
Corporate Laws.
40 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
41 Draft Version, South Carolina Business Act of 1962, at 226.
42 N.Y. Sess. Laws, c. 855 (1961).
43 See Hoffman, supra note 8.
44 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(g) requires the existence of such a provision to be noted
conspicuously on the face or back of every share certificate issued.
45 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a)-(c).
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tors from liability for managerial acts or omissions that is ordinarily
imposed on directors and imposes that liability upon the shareholders
authorizing the provision or consenting to it, to the extent that and so
long as the discretion or powers of the board are controlled by the pro-
vision.48
Section 630" of the New York Business Corporation Law is unusual.
Before the passage of that statute, New York 48-- along with a few other
states-imposed upon shareholders unlimited liability for debts, wages,
and salaries (including "fringe benefits") the corporation owed em-
ployees. In other words, these states made an important exception to the
principle that shareholders are shielded from unlimited liability and
risk only the funds they invest in the enterprise. Section 630 retains
shareholders' unlimited liability for employee claims, but it imposes
this liability only on the ten largest shareholders in a corporation whose
shares are not traded on a national exchange or in an over-the-counter
market by a national securities association or its affiliate.49
In 1963 the Florida legislature enacted the first separate close cor-
poration statute.50 That statute is set forth in full at the end of this
article as an Appendix. Space will not permit a detailed analysis and
appraisal of the statute here.
The Florida legislature is to be commended for recognizing that close
corporations have special needs that require changes in the law. The
statute as enacted, however, is incomplete and vaguely drawn, and there-
fore does not adequately meet those needs. 1
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The legislative changes described in the last two sections of this
article have been supplemented by rather extensive judicial develop-
ments. Close corporations have been pishing into the courtrooms to
strain and erode legal concepts developed for public-issue institutions.,,
In an increasing number of cases, the courts are not even giving "lip
service" to the proposition that a single set of legal principles regulate
both public-issue and close corporations. For instance, in recognition of
46 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(f).
47 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630.
48 See Rogers & McManus, "Stockholders' Booby-Trap: Partnership Liabilities Under
Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law," 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1149 (1953).
49 A shareholder who has paid more than his pro rata share is entitled to joint and
several contribution from the other nine shareholders with respect to the excess paid.
50 Fla. Stat. §§ 608.0100-.0107 (1963).
51 For further discussion of some of these problems, see Note, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 569
(1964). For a brief comparison of the Florida statute with those of New York and North
Carolina, see 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1551 (1964).
52 See Prunty, "1959 Survey of New York Law-Business Associations," 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1425 (1959).
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the fact that participants in close corporations usually disregard corpo-
rate formalities, courts consistently give effect to informal corporate
action. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated not long ago53 that
Ica very small or closed corporation is not held to the strict formalities
that are applicable to large corporations .... " And a California court55
has frankly said that it will not apply the technical rules commonly
applied to corporations to "a close family corporation of two shareholders
of equal ownership" if the application of those rules will "serve to defeat
such equality of ownership, impede justice and perpetrate fraud," and
that it will not permit mere "irregularities" in the transactions of a
family corporation to affect the validity of those transactions.56
The courts are also beginning to draw distinctions between close cor-
porations and public-issue corporations in other kinds of cases. A Wis-
consin court5 7 has indicated that it considers the issuance of stock for
materially less than its value to be stronger evidence of an oppressive
scheme against minority shareholders in a close corporation than it
would be in a publicly-held corporation. A Pennsylvania court58 com-
pelled the president of a close corporation specifically to perform a con-
tract in which he promised to sell a specified number of shares in the
company to a person accepting employment with it, the court concluding
that the purchaser's remedy at law was inadequate because stock in a
close corporation is of peculiar value to an employee and such stock is not
purchasable on the market and has no quoted or ascertainable market
value.
And a number of courts,5 9 in cases involving close corporations, have
imposed a fiduciary duty on shareholders to exercise the utmost good
faith in their dealings with each other. Thus, an Iowa court 5 set aside
a new issue of stock to the controlling shareholders of a close corporation
on the ground that the issue violated the preemptive rights of a fellow
shareholder, even though the complaining shareholder, a well-educated
53 Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958).
54 Id. at 492, 140 A.2d at 814. Similarly, in Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass. 653, 189 N.E.ed
509 (1963), the court stated: "This was a small family corporation conducted without over-
emphasis on corporate formalities and reasonably is not to be held to the strict standards
of larger commercial organizations." Id. at 659, 189 N.E.2d at 512. See also Crane Valley
Land Co. v. Bank of America, 182 Cal. App. 2d 166, 173, 5 Cal. Rptr. 731, 736 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Freeman v. King Pontiac Co., 236 S.C. 335, 350, 114 S.E.2d 478, 485 (1960).
55 Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 140 P.2d 210 (1943). In this case, the
founder of a close corporation had bequeathed all of the stock in it to his two children in
equal ownership. The court refused to sustain a contention that one of the children was not
entitled to vote his shares because valid share certificates had not been issued to him.
56 Id. at 739, 140 P.2d at 215-16.
57 Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 227-28, 23 N.W.2d 620, 631 (1946).
58 Aldrich v. Geahry, 360 Pa. 376, 61 A.2d 843 (1948).
59 E.g., Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 60 N.W.2d 820 (1953); Sher v.
Sandier, 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950); see generally O'Neal, supra note 4, § 8.07.60 Gord v. lowana Farms Milk Co., supra note 59.
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man and thoroughly familiar with the business, had signed a waiver of-
his preemptive rights. The court stated 1 that the controlling shareholders
were under a duty to disclose to the complaining shareholder before he
signed the waiver the actual value of the new shares, that the issue price
was less than that value, and that the issue would have a diluting effect
on his holdings.
Another illustration of the application of different rules, depending on
whether the corporation involved is close or publicly held, is in the ad-
missibility of corporate books and records in criminal prosecutions against
the corporation's shareholders or officers. Although books and records of
a corporation ordinarily are not admissible in a criminal prosecution
against its shareholders or officers without a showing that the defendants
made the entries in the books or records, caused them to be made, or
assented to them, a number of cases, in effect extending to close cor-
porations the rules applicable to the admissibility of partnership books,
have held that books of a close corporation are admissible against share-
holders or officers without such a showing. 2
An interesting Ohio case, Standard International Corp. v. McDonald
Printing Co., 3 illustrates the growing readiness of courts to protect the
reasonable expectations of shareholders in close corporations, even though
those expectations are not reflected in shareholders' agreements, corpo-
rate charters, or by-laws in a way that calls for protection under tradi-
tional doctrine. In that case, five of the corporation's eight shareholders
constituted its board of directors. Two of the directors, who together
owned slightly more than fifty per cent of the company's outstanding
shares, entered into a contract to sell their shares to an outsider at $33
per share. The other three directors were opposed to the sale, and the
directors by a vote of three to two authorized the issuance of 7,000
additional shares to Walter McDonald, one of the three directors, at a
price of $37.50 per share. The company's charter contained clauses (1)
waiving shareholders' pre-emptive rights and (2) providing that stock
issues should be subscribed for and sold as determined by resolution
adopted by a majority of the board of directors. The action of the
directors in issuing the shares to McDonald was challenged on the ground
that since McDonald's vote was necessary for passage of the resolution,
the resolution had not received the favorable vote of a disinterested
majority of directors.64
61 Id. at 18, 60 N.W.2d at 830.
62 See Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1935); Cullen v. United States, 2
F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 593 (1925); Annot., 154 A.L.R. 279, 282
(1945).
63 13 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 159 N.E.2d 822 (C.P. 1959).
64 The directors' action could also have been challenged on the ground that directors are
1965]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The court, however, sustained the board's action, holding that the
articles of incorporation are the basis for individual corporate existence
and "lay the foundation and limits for corporate action . . . ."" The
decision undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that this was a closely
held corporation and that the participants probably had contemplated
that a majority of the shares would not be transferred to an outsider.66
The court commented that the testimony showed that the purpose of the
three directors in selling the stock to McDonald was to "perpetuate the
company on the basis it had originally been set up. '67
In an unusual and interesting case,6" the Superior Court of New
Jersey showed no hesitancy in disregarding the separate legal personali-
ties of several corporations which had been formed to conduct a family
enterprise. On the death of the founder of the business, his widow and
seven children formed a partnership. A son, Anthony, who for a number
of years before his father's death had managed the business, continued
as general manager. Over the years, in the course of the evolution and
expansion of the business, Anthony used partnership funds to organize
or purchase a number of corporations, which were utilized as instru-
mentalities or departments of the partnership enterprise. Dissention
eventually developed among the 'partners, and Anthony brought suit for
dissolution of the partnership. In the dissolution proceedings, Arthur,
one of the brothers, insisted that the family enterprises constituted a
single integrated partnership operation, even though some phases of it
were conducted in corporate form, and that he was entitled to be paid
in full in cash for his interest and not in part by a distribution of shares
in the various corporations. His reasons for taking this position were
explained by the court as follows: "As a member of a partnership that
under a fiduciary duty not to manipulate share issues for the benefit of any one group of
shareholders. See Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268
(Dist. Ct. App. 1936); RossTransp., Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946);
Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair
Co., 253 N.Y. 275, 170 N.E. 917 (1930).
65 Standard Int'l Corp. v. McDonald Printing Co., 13 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 334-35, 159 N.E.2d
822, 824 (C.P. 1959).
66 But for a case in which expectations of a shareholder in a close corporation were not
protected, see Gwin v. Thunderbird Motor Hotels, Inc., 216 Ga. 652, 119 S.E.2d 14 (1961)
(holder of 50% of stock did not have 50% control in view of by-law providing for 3-man
board and the holding over of board with unfriendly majority due to deadlock among
shareholders).
67 Standard Int'l Corp. v. McDonald Printing Co., supra n6te'65, at 335, 159 N.E.2d at
824. For another case in which a court protected what it considered to be the reasonable ex-
pectations of participants in a closely held corporation, see Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich.
111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961). There, the court commented that shareholders who, pursuant
to arrangements for promoting the corporation had erected a bowling alley and leased it to
the corporation, "had the burden of proving they delivered a building in accordance with the
expectation of all concerned at the time the lease was executed." Id. at 122, 108 N.W.2d at
912.
68 Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (App. Div. 1958).
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owns several corporations he has an effective voice in partnership policy
and operation, but as a minority stockholder he could be over-ruled by
a majority vote. Further, his minority interest in a closed family cor-
poration does not have a market value commensurate with its actual
value."69 The court concluded that partnership and the corporations
constituted a single enterprise,7" and that as creditors or other outsiders
were not involved, it could ignore the corporations' separate personalities
in order to do justice among the partners. The court's order was novel.
Recognizing that a forced sale of the partnership would destroy a great
part of the value of the business, the court approved a proposal sug-
gested by Arthur during the oral argument6 if the other partners would
agree to an appraisal of the partnership under the court's supervision and
payment to Arthur of one-eighth of the valuation fixed in the appraisal,
the court would so order; otherwise, it would order a liquidation by sale
of all partnership assets, including those owned by the corporations."1
Interestingly, the court was of the opinion that it could not directly order
the remaining partners to buy out Arthur's interest.72
CAUTIOUS SUGGESTIONS :FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
As has been shown in the section of this article immediately preceed-
ing, the courts in this country are moving steadily, though slowly and
often clumsily and gropingly, to develop separate rules suitable for the
regulation of close corporations. Nevertheless, they need to do a great
deal more.
The two principal conceptualistic barriers to judicial development of
satisfactory rules for the close corporation are: (1) the principle of
majority rule in corporate management, and (2) the business judgment
rule. These principles, for reasons set forth in the following paragraphs,
should not be applied in unqualified and indiscriminate fashion to small
business corporations.7"
69 Id. at 496, 144 A.2d at 214.
70 A number of recent decisions, in recognizing that the several business organizations
used in a large family enterprise were a single economic unit and treating them as a unit for
certain legal purposes, have used language and reasoning reminiscent of the "enterprise
entity" theory of Professor Adolf A. Berle, Jr. See, e.g., Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms,
Inc., 37 Del. Ch. 530, 537-39, 146 A.2d 602, 607 (Ch. 1958) ; Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Marking Corp., 26 N.J. 229, 235, 139 A.2d 281, 284 (1958).
71 "That the alternative granted is novel does not deter us, for it is 'no objection to the
exercise of jurisdiction that, in the ever-changing phases of social relations, a new case is
presented and new features of wrong are involved."' Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51
N.J. Super. 482, 505, 144 A.2d 207, 219 (Super. Ct. 1958).
72 Ibid. Weissman v. Henkin, 154 Pa. Super. 12, 34 A.2d 907 (Super. Ct. 1943), was cited
as authority for this proposition.
73 Many of the ideas set forth in the next few paragraphs were first advanced by the
author in O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression in Close Corporations: Remedies in America
and in Britain, 1 Boston 0Coil. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
1965]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The principle of majority rule is in traditional legal thought a firmly
established attribute of the corporate form. Apparently without close
examination, courts have accorded the principle of majority rule the
same sanctity in corporate enterprises, including small businesses, that
it enjoys in the political world. Yet many participants in closely-held
corporations are "little people," unsophisticated in business and financial
matters. Not uncommonly a participant in a closely-held enterprise
invests all his assets in the business with an expectation, often reasonable
under the circumstances even in the absence of express contract, that
he will be a key employee in the company and will have a voice in
business decisions. Thus, when courts apply the principle of majority
rule in close corporations, they often disappoint the reasonable expecta-
tions of the participants.
The indiscriminate application of the business judgment rule to sustain
action of directors in close corporations is also subject to criticism. That
rule seems to be grounded on the following ideas: (1) shareholders have
selected the directors to manage the business, and courts are not justified
in substituting their judgment for that of managers selected by the
owners of the business; (2) directors' decisions are based on complex
business considerations and courts are simply not qualified to make those
decisions and should not interfere with them in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion; and (3) a heavy burden should be placed on com-
plaining shareholders to discourage "strike suits" and frivolous litigation.
These justifications for the business judgment rule, however, do not
apply in all their vigor in a close corporation. Courts may well consider
intervention to protect minority shareholders in a close corporation
against oppressive action by the directors (unfair dividend policies, for
example), even though fraud, bad faith or, for that matter, clear un-
reasonableness on the part of the directors cannot be shown. Participants
in a close corporation do not usually think of themselves as delegating
management of their corporation to.an independent board of directors;
a board is often viewed only as a legal formality. Owners and managers,
insofar as the participants look into the future, are to be the same.
Minority shareholders expect to share in management.
It hardly seems necessary in all cases to say, as the courts so often
have said in effect, that when a person becomes a shareholder in a cor-
poration he assumes a status with all 9f its legally built-in liabilities,
irrespective of his and his associates' intentions and expectations. Fur-
ther, in a close corporation, where the business considerations on which
directors' decisions are based are likely to be somewhat less intricate
than in public-issue corporations and the directors making the decisions
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are likely to be somewhat less knowledgeable, judges have less reason
to show an unquestioning deference to decisions of a directorate. Finally,
the great practical danger of a too-ready judicial interference with
public-issue corporations, the danger of encouraging "strike suits," is not
present, at least not in the same degree.
The courts have been particularly timid and lacking in resourcefulness
in evolving decrees to meet typical close corporation problems, i.e.,
decrees that will adequately protect oppressed minority shareholders.
This judicial timidity probably could be overcome by a statute such as
Section 12-22.23 of the South Carolina Business Corporations Act,.4
which expressly gives the courts almost unfettered discretion to impose
upon the parties to a dispute in a close corporation whatever settlement
the court considers just and equitable. Perhaps a statute of that kind
could even be improved by providing for hearings in chambers, thus
avoiding publicity which might adversely affect the corporation or the
shareholders. 75
Now for a few comments on recent legislation dealing with share-
holders' agreements and other arrangements that take from the directors
powers normally within their province or otherwise depart from the
traditional pattern of corporation management. These statutes are part
of a steady movement that has been occurring in the regulation of the
relations of participants in close corporations. Yet these statutes typically
limit this newly-granted contractual freedom in two important respects.
One limitation that is commonly imposed is a requirement that control
arrangements departing from the traditional pattern of corporation
management must be inserted in a particular document in order to be
valid. For instance, in New York high quorum and high vote require-
ments for shareholder and director action70 or an arrangement limiting
the powers of the directors 77 must be inserted in the certificate of in-
corporation. Similarly, the South Carolina statute provides that a share-
holders' agreement that limits or restricts the powers of the directors
must be set forth, or be referred to, in the articles of incorporation.71
The policy underlying such requirements is not clear. While inclusion
of control arrangements in the corporation's charter might provide notice
of the provisions in some cases to those dealing with the corporation,
it is difficult to see why such persons would be concerned with the cor-
74 See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
75 The Report of the Departmental Committee on Law Amendment, (Northern Ireland),
Cmd. 393, at 11, suggests rules of court providing for hearings in chambers in applications
under § 210 of the English Company Act, supra note 40.
76 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616, 709 (1963).
77 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620 (1963).
78 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.22(b) (1) (Supp. 1964).
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poration's internal operations. After all, persons dealing with a corpora-
tion who are unaware of high vote requirements or other special control
arrangements are protected by the doctrine of apparent authority, which
binds the corporation to contracts and other transactions apparently
within the authority of agents representing the corporation.
Statutes directing the inclusion in the corporation's charter of specified
kinds of control arrangements may provide a clear guide for an ex-
perienced member of the corporate bar to follow in tailoring the corpo-
rate form of business to the needs of his clients. Unfortunately, general
practitioners serving small businessmen often do not realize that some
shareholders' control agreements must be included in the corporation's
charter to be effective. fI anyone doubts that lawyers in states with
such a requirement often overlook it, an examination of the reported
cases will remove those doubts.
A general practitioner often concludes that the simplest and most
effective method of implementing the shareholders' business bargain on
control of the corporation is by a carefully drafted written agreement
signed by all interested parties. Great injustice usually results in these
situations if some of the parties are allowed to "welch" on their deal.
Sometimes a court, undoubtedly swayed by the prospect of such in-
justices, finds a way to enforce an agreement even though it is not in
the prescribed form.79
A second limitation that some statutes impose on shareholders' voting
agreements is to restrict their validity to a ten-year period."0 Apparently
this limitation is based on the precedent contained in statutes dealing
with voting trusts, which statutes in the past have typically limited voting
trusts to ten years.81 Whatever the soundness of a policy imposing a
time limitation on the term of a voting trust, such a limitation on the
term of an agreement among shareholders in a close corporation appears
highly questionable.
When a ten-year control agreement expires, minority shareholders
again become vulnerable to the principle of majority rule and are thrown
upon the often not-so-tender mercies of majority shareholders."2 The
79 See, e.g., Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. 1953).
80 E.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.15 (Supp. 1964).
81 The Reporter's Note to § 12-16.15 [§ 6.15 of the Draft Statute] provides: "Finally, so
as to place the voting trust and pooling agreement on a parity, the proposed section pro-
vides that voting agreements should be limited to ten years, subject to extension." Draft
Version, South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1962 at 106. It is interesting to note
that a number of states now validate voting trusts for periods of time longer than ten years.
See e.g., Cal. Corp.'Code § 2231; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.27 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.365
(1957).
82 For a documented story of the oppression of minority shareholders in small business
enterprises see O'Neal & Derwin, Expulsion and Oppression of Business Assodates (1961).
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stake of minority shareholders in the enterprise will then probably be
greater in dollar value than at the time of the making of the contract,
and their chance of making a satisfactory business connection elsewhere
will probably be less.
Is it too bold to suggest that perhaps businessmen in a close corporation
should be given the same freedom to contract among themselves in re-
spect to the corporation's management that businessmen in general are
given to contract with each other? Are there really sound policy reasons
for requiring a shareholders' agreement to be embodied in the charter
or for limiting its term to ten years? A shareholders' control agreement
in a close corporation is often designed to protect the underdog-the
minority shareholder-and he invests in the enterprise on the faith of
the security he thinks the agreement provides. Should majority share-
holders be permitted to "welch" on their deal and assume almost un-
restricted control over the corporations' affairs just because the lawyer
serving the parties did not embody the agreement in the charter? To
this writer, the answer to each of these questions is "No." At least that
clearly is the answer if all shareholders in the corporation are parties
to the agreement. If some of the shareholders are not parties, perhaps
that answer has to be given somewhat more cautiously; but even then,
no reason is apparent for permitting parties to a carefully-bargained
shareholders' agreement to repudiate their promises with impunity on
the ground that the agreement may be prejudicial to noncontracting
parties when those persons are not in court complaining of its alleged
adverse effect on them. In this area of the law, a number of sacred
cows are overdue for slaughter.
APPENDIX
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 608.0100-.0106 (Supp. 1964):
Section 608.0100 Scope; definitions
(1) The provisions of this act shall extend to all close corporations,
but shall be deemed permissive and not mandatory; provided, however,
that this act shall have no application to any close corporation in
existence on September 1, 1963, hereof unless such previously existing
close corporation shall elect to bring itself within the provisions of this
act by written consent of the owners of a majority of the voting stock.
(2) As used herein, closed corporations means a corporation for
profit whose shares of stock are not generally traded in the markets
maintained by securities dealers or brokers.
1965]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
(3) Whenever applicable, the provisions of this act shall apply not-
withstanding any provision of this act to the contrary.
(4) Wherever used herein, unless otherwise stated, stockholders shall
mean stockholder if there be only one stockholder of a corporation.
Section 608.0101 Acquisition of all the shares of stock by limited number
of persons
(1) The existence of a corporation, hereafter or heretofore formed
under the laws of this state, shall in no respect be deemed impaired by
the acquisition of all the shares of stock of such corporation by one
person or by two persons, nor shall the corporation, by such acquisition,
be deemed not to possess any managerial boards or bodies or any capa-
cities, powers or authority which it would have possessed with three or
more stockholders, nor shall the corporation, upon such acquisition, be
deemed to have become dormant, inactive or incapable of acting as a
corporation.
(2) The acquisition, heretofore or hereafter, of all of the shares of
stock of a corporation by one person or by two persons is hereby declared
to violate no policy or provision of the laws of this state.
Section 608.0102 Corporation management by stockholders
The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may provide that
the business of the corporation shall be managed by the stockholders of
the corporation rather than by a board of directors, provided that there
be not less than three stockholders; and, if the articles of incorporation
provide as aforesaid, the following provisions shall apply:
(1) Wherever the context requires, the stockholders of such close
corporation shall be deemed directors of such corporation for purposes
of applying the provisions of part I, chapter 608.
(2) The stockholders of such close corporation shall be subject to
the liabilities imposed by part I, chapter 608, for action taken by
directors.
(3) Any action required or permitted by part I, chapter 608, to be
taken by the directors of a corporation may be taken by action of the
stockholders of such close corporation at a meeting of the stockholders
or as provided in § 608.0104.
Section 608.0103 Conduct of business without meeting by board of
directors or executive committee
If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board of direc-
tors, action taken by the directors or the members of an executive com-
mittee of the directors without a meeting shall nevertheless be board or
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committee action if written consent to the action in question is signed
by all the directors or members of the committee, as the case may be,
and filed with the minutes of the proceedings of the board or committee,
whether done before or after the action so taken.
Section 608.0104 Conduct of business without meeting by stockholders
Any action of the stockholders of a close corporation may be taken
without a meeting if consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken,
shall be signed by all the persons who would be entitled to vote upon
such action at a meeting and filed with the secretary of the corporation
as part of the corporate records. Such consent shall have the same force
and effect as a unanimous vote of the stockholders, and may be stated
as such in any certificate or document filed with the secretary of state
under this chapter.
Section 608.0105 Written agreements as to conduct of certain affairs
of corporation
(1) The stockholders of a close corporation may enter into a written
agreement, embodied in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the
corporation, or in a side agreement in writing and signed by all the
parties thereto, relating to any phase of the affairs of the corporation,
including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Management of the business of the corporation.
(b) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of profits.
(c) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the corporation.
(d) Restrictions on transfer of stock.
(e) Voting requirements, including the requirements of unanimous
voting of stockholders or directors.
(f) Employment of stockholders by the corporation.
(g) Arbitration of issues as to which the stockholders are deadlocked
in voting powers or as to which the directors are deadlocked and
the stockholders are unable to break the deadlock.
(2) No written agreement to which stockholders of a close corpora-
tion have actually assented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws
of the corporation or in any side agreement in writing and signed by all
the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase of the affairs of the
corporation, whether to the management of its business or division of
its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto,
on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the
corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their relationships
in a manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
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(3) If the business of a close corporation is managed by a board of
directors, an agreement among all or less than all of the stockholders,
whether solely among themselves or between one or more of them and
a party who is not a stockholder, is not invalid, as among the parties
thereto, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the affairs of
the corporation as to interfere with the discretion of the board of
directors, but the making of such an agreement shall impose upon the
stockholders who are parties thereto the liability for managerial acts
that is imposed by the laws of this state upon directors.
Section 608.0106 Director
The stockholders of a close corporation entitled to elect a director
of such corporation may at any time remove such director, with or
without cause, by like action of the stockholders as required for the
election of such director, absent a contrary provision by agreement or
in the bylaws or articles of incorporation of the corporation.
Section 608.0107 Dissolution; appointment of receiver or trustee
The circuit court, sitting in chancery, may entertain a petition of any
stockholder for involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and,
at the hearing, may appoint a receiver or trustee of the corporation and
order it dissolved, pursuant to the procedure provided in § 608.29, when
it is made to appear:
1. That the directors of the corporation are deadlocked in the manage-
ment of the corporate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break
the deadlock, or
2. That the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power; and
3. Arbitration or any other remedy provided in any written agreement
of the stockholders upon deadlock of the directors or stockholders has
failed.
